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Abstract 
 
While there is a growing body of research on the 
success factors in crowdfunding campaigns, much less 
is known about the factors that influence the success 
of crowdfunding platforms. We begin to address this 
gap in research by examining real estate 
crowdfunding platforms (RECPs) which connect real 
estate investors with real estate capital seekers. To 
understand how entrepreneurs leverage technology in 
this context, we drew on resource orchestration theory 
and we conducted a multi-case analysis across seven 
RECPs in the United States. We discovered that RECP 
founders and executives view technology as a focal 
resource orchestration mechanism that is critical for 
platform success. We identified five higher-order 
themes that describe entrepreneurial goals in 
leveraging technology: efficiency, agility, scalability, 
reach and personalization. We also examined how 
different platforms solved the two-sided market launch 
challenge and we found that entrepreneurs developed 
a number of different strategies. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Continuous evolution of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) provides a fertile 
foundation for new forms of entrepreneurship. In this 
study, we address the recent call for research on 
questions arising at the intersection of technology and 
entrepreneurship [33] and we examine the role of 
technology in entrepreneurial venture development 
across seven real estate crowdfunding platforms in the 
United States. In this context, we evaluate how 
individual entrepreneurial ventures leverage 
technology to acquire and orchestrate resources in 
response to regulatory changes that afforded novel 
entrepreneurial venture fundraising opportunities.  
The emergent real estate crowdfunding platforms 
represent a rapidly evolving domain within the broader 
crowdfunding phenomenon. The platforms that are the 
subject of our study collectively facilitated over $7.2 
billion in real estate transactions over a period of just 
a few years. Despite the growing practical importance 
of real estate crowdfunding, there is little in the way of 
holistic theory on the factors that contribute to the 
success of the real estate crowdfunding platforms. 
This is in part due to the unique context in which the 
platforms evolved.  
Real estate crowdfunding platforms connect real 
estate investors with real estate capital seekers, 
referred to as sponsors in the industry. Prior to 2012, 
general public solicitation of investments was 
prohibited in the United States. The JOBS Act, which 
was passed in 2012, afforded several new exemptions 
for public investment solicitations that facilitated the 
emergence of new types of crowdfunding platforms 
[12, 47]. The changes in regulation represent an 
important environmental consideration in our study. 
However, we find that changes in regulation had 
differing effects across the platforms that we 
examined. While the regulatory changes enabled 
market entry for several platforms, the indirect effects 
that legitimized online crowdfunding as a more 
general practice proved more important than the direct 
regulatory effects for a number of platforms in our 
study. 
A further distinguishing characteristic of our study 
is that we focus on the successful launch of 
technology-enabled entrepreneurial businesses that 
are two-sided markets. Two-sided markets pose a 
double challenge for entrepreneurs in that they must 
solve the parallel tasks of bringing each side of the 
market to the platform. Real estate investors would 
only want to join a platform that already has real estate 
sponsors and vice versa. In this context, bringing the 
two sides together when neither is already on the 
platform poses a significant challenge. We examine 
how different entrepreneurial ventures solved the two-
sided market challenge and we find that real estate 
crowdfunding entrepreneurs developed a number of 
different strategies.  
To structure our analysis, we draw on the resource 
orchestration theory [5, 46], which posits that 
understanding how business ventures acquire, 
recombine and leverage resources is central to 
understanding how they achieve success. We examine 
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the role of technology as the key resource 
orchestration mechanism in platform-based ventures. 
The following research questions guide our study: 1) 
How do entrepreneurs leverage technology to 
orchestrate resources to launch new platform-based 
ventures? 2) How do entrepreneurs solve the two-
sided market challenge? To develop a holistic 
theoretical perspective, we follow the 
recommendations for theory development in emergent 
contexts [16, 17] and we conduct multiple case study 
analysis [57]. Interviews with the company founders 
and executives as well as secondary data comprising 
publicly available information about the individual 
companies serve as the sources of data underlying our 
analysis. 
We found that the entrepreneurs in our study 
recognized the transformative nature of ICT 
innovations in real estate financing and they built 
technology-based platforms to enable innovative real 
estate fundraising practices. The entrepreneurs see the 
respective platforms that they developed as a critical 
source of competitive advantage through 
encapsulation of innovative business practices within 
the systems and achievement of efficiencies that 
would not be otherwise possible. The entrepreneurs 
continually invest in platform development to sustain 
the initial advantage. In terms of the key factors for 
launching two-sided platforms, we find that 
entrepreneurs developed several different strategies 
for successful launch. While some platforms chose to 
internalize one side of the market, others seeded their 
platforms by bringing either investors or sponsors onto 
the platform first. These results contribute to the 
ongoing discussion of effective seeding strategies in 
multi-sided markets [14, 34]. 
 
2. Literature review and theoretical 
foundations 
 
There are several research areas that provide the 
theoretical background for our work. First, real estate 
crowdfunding is an emergent area within the broader 
crowdfunding phenomenon. Second, real estate 
crowdfunding platforms are important examples of 
digital entrepreneurship uniquely affected by the focal 
role of technology in these businesses. Third, real 
estate crowdfunding platforms are two-sided markets 
connecting capital seekers with capital providers. We 
also review prior research on resource orchestration 
that provides the overarching theoretical lens for our 
study. In the following sections, we review and 
synthesize the key studies on crowdfunding, digital 
entrepreneurship, two-sided markets, and resource 
orchestration theory. 
 
2.1. Crowdfunding 
Real estate crowdfunding platforms are a part of a 
broader crowdfunding phenomenon. Crowdfunding 
refers to many different types of activities whereby 
individuals or companies solicit funding from a broad 
audience, typically via the internet [3]. Four distinct 
types of crowdfunding are commonly recognized. 
Reward-based crowdfunding, exemplified by 
Kickstarter, allows entrepreneurs as well as artists to 
raise required funding for their projects [31]. Project 
backers typically commit relatively small amounts and 
they are commonly offered a reward in exchange for 
the contribution. The rewards range from a discount 
on the planned product or service to attendance of the 
premiere for artistic performances. Project backers 
receive no equity in the projects that they fund. There 
are also platforms that enable purely altruistic 
donations to different causes, e.g. GoFundMe.org. 
These platforms exemplify donation-based 
crowdfunding activities [25]. 
Debt and equity-based crowdfunding platforms 
broker connections between capital seekers and capital 
providers who are primarily motivated by the expected 
financial returns on their investment [1]. Individuals 
and companies can participate on both sides of the 
market. For example, LendingClub began as a peer-to-
peer (P2P) unsecured personal loan marketplace, but 
evolved to include institutional investors as an 
important group of participants on the platform [18]. 
Similarly, OnDeck began as a business-to-business 
(B2B) marketplace for business loans and evolved to 
include individual investors as an important source of 
capital on the platform [29]. There are two important 
distinctions between debt and equity-based 
crowdfunding platforms in terms of the investor 
risk/reward profile [27]. Debt-based crowdfunding 
platforms typically offer a fixed interest rate and 
repayment term (commonly 6-18 months), whereas 
equity-based crowdfunding generally offers little 
certainty for potential investors because new ventures 
typically take 5-7 years to return capital to investors 
and many entrepreneurial ventures lead to partial or 
complete loss of the investment [56]. 
Real estate crowdfunding can involve different 
legal structures that govern investor/platform/sponsor 
relationships. While some platforms facilitate direct 
investments in real estate loans that offer fixed interest 
rates and repayment terms at origination, others offer 
equity position in real estate investments that carry 
much more uncertainty in terms of the potential 
appreciation (or loss) and liquidity (ability to exit the 
investment). Therefore, the investor risk/reward 
profile varies significantly across the real estate 
crowdfunding platform and that will be an important 
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consideration in the evaluation of resource 
orchestration that supported the launch of the 
innovative product/service offerings across the 
platforms. 
2.2. Digital entrepreneurship 
 
Online real estate crowdfunding platforms 
leverage technology to offer innovative services to 
both sides of the market. On one side, the platforms 
provide real estate investment opportunities for 
potential investors. On the other, by establishing a 
more direct route to financing, the platforms provide 
access to capital at a lower cost to the real estate 
sponsors. Because technology plays a central role in 
this context, real estate crowdfunding platforms 
exemplify a case of digital entrepreneurship that 
emerges at the intersection of entrepreneurship and 
digital technologies [33]. 
While digital entrepreneurship is only beginning to 
emerge as a focal point for research in information 
systems, questions concerning the role of technology 
in entrepreneurial ventures have been examined in the 
past. For example, Kelley and Rice [24]  examined the 
role of alliances in successful technology 
commercialization. The authors analyzed the 
performance of 67 computer and telecom firms in the 
United States and concluded that alliances helped the 
ventures in this space to develop and commercialize a 
broader base of intellectual property. Recognizing that 
technology adoption is a complex social phenomenon 
that involves a network of actors including regulators 
and local governments, Garud and Karnoe [21] 
compared the adoption of wind turbines in the United 
States and Denmark. The authors concluded that the 
broad adoption of novel technologies can proceed 
through different routes, in part due to action from 
different agents involved. Further, the authors 
discovered that while breakthrough innovation 
adoption does happen, more commonly, bricolage 
through multi-agent involvement plays a key role in 
the adoption of new technologies. 
Universities often play a key role in the 
development of new technologies. Markman et al. [30] 
examined the structure of different University 
Technology Transfer Offices (UTTOs) that are 
typically tasked with commercializing new 
technologies developed by universities and concluded 
that a greater degree of independence of the UTTOs 
was associated with the greater success in new 
technology commercialization. More recent research 
on technology commercialization examined how 
network externalities affect the success of different 
entrepreneurial strategies and found that the presence 
of network externalities produced a complex set of 
outcomes through interaction with the business 
strategy choice [36].  Symeonidou et al. [48] examined 
the effects of international technology 
commercialization strategy and concluded that 
intellectual property (IP) licensing produced the best 
commercialization option for technology-based 
ventures. 
Focusing on the entrepreneurial process, 
Doganova & Eyquem-Renault [13] explored how 
technology entrepreneurs socialize their ventures with 
the broader audience and found that entrepreneurs 
commonly discuss their “business models” in order to 
gauge interest among potential customers and 
potential investors, thus revealing a unique role of 
business models as a narrative tool in the 
entrepreneurial process.  
The extant research on technology 
commercialization suggests that the evaluation of the 
business model narratives that are being used by the 
individual real estate crowdfunding platforms affords 
an opportunity to gain insight on how entrepreneurial 
ventures acquire, orchestrate and leverage the 
resources across different real estate crowdfunding 
platforms.  
The recent call for digital entrepreneurship 
research [33] noted that because the nature of 
technology makes traditional firm boundaries more 
“porous and fluid”, digital entrepreneurship is 
characterized by less bounded forms that have an 
evolving set of actors and less pre-defined outcomes. 
Digital platforms, defined as “a shared set of services 
and architecture that serves to host complementary 
offering” [35], provide a particularly important 
construct in the examination of the role of technology 
in entrepreneurship because of the technology 
capacity to produce unprompted change. Digital 
platforms are typically multi-sided markets. In the 
next section, we review prior research on two-sided 
markets. 
 
2.3. Two-sided markets 
 
Two-sided markets are defined as “a platform 
providing goods or services to two distinct end-users 
where the platform attempts to set the price for each 
type of end-user to get both sides on board” [40, 41]. 
Two-sided platforms create value by enabling 
interactions among the agents. Network externalities, 
i.e. the exponential relationship between the number 
of participants and the platform value, have been a 
focal point for research in economics that aims to 
address the question of the optimal platform size  [40, 
41].  
Cross-side network effects play an important role 
in the success of two-sided markets. Platforms that 
enjoy cross-side network effects often grow to the 
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position of market dominance [32]. For example, 
credit card payment processing platforms enjoy cross-
side network effects. A greater number of credit card 
users incentivizes more merchants to accept specific 
credit cards and, in turn, a broader acceptance of a 
specific type of credit card by a greater number of 
merchants leads to a greater value of a specific credit 
card for the consumers. Because two-sided platforms 
often enjoy cross-side network effects and 
consequently grow to a position of dominance, there is 
a growing body of research on the regulatory 
implications of two-sided markets [55]. 
A parallel stream of research on two-sided markets 
in economics focuses on the question of optimal 
pricing by the platform providers [23, 43]. The optimal 
strategy depends on the specific context, but it is not 
uncommon for platforms to make the use of the 
platform free for one side of the market, subsidized by 
charging the participants on the other side. For 
example, KickStarter does not charge project backers, 
but the company does charge funding requestors. 
There has also been some research on the key 
factors that enable market entry by a competing two-
sided platform. The key consideration in the 
competition among two-sided market platforms is the 
market participant multi-homing, i.e. participation on 
multiple platforms. Econometric models suggest that 
limited degree of market participant lock-in exposes 
incumbent platforms to competition from new entrants 
[58].  Analysis of the effects of regulation on two-
sided markets suggests counterintuitive results, in that 
regulation may benefit incumbent platforms by 
erecting barriers to entry for new platforms [15].  
 
2.5. Resource orchestration 
 
Resource orchestration theory [8, 46] is an 
extension of the resource based view (RBV) theory 
[52, 53, 54] and it emphasizes the critical role of 
management activities in resource orchestration as a 
key factor in a company’s success. Resource 
orchestration theory has been applied in a number of 
studies focusing on entrepreneurial success. A study of 
family firms in Switzerland suggested that 
intergenerational involvement through participative 
strategy plays a key role in the success of the family 
firms [8]. A study of entrepreneurial firms in Sweden 
suggested that resource orchestration through 
managerial action had an amplifying effect on the 
success of the firms [51]. Chadwick et al. [7] showed 
that human resource orchestration through executive 
commitment to human resource management systems 
had a positive relationship with the firms’ financial 
performance. Baert et al. [2] explored the key 
activities among portfolio investors in startups and 
suggested that harmonization of investment themes 
was important to realizing positive returns. Carnes et 
al. [6] offered a theoretical argument that new firms 
must focus on resource acquisition. However, 
Symeonidou and Nicolau [49] examined the effects of 
investment in human capital by new ventures and 
concluded that different industries have different 
optimal human resource investment profiles. Over- 
and under-investment in human resources is 
associated with firm underperformance. Focusing on 
the role of technology in resource orchestration, Liu et 
al. [26] showed that technology alignment with the 
business needs plays a key role in business 
performance.  
We draw on resource orchestration theory as the 
overarching framework in our study. While the 
resource orchestration theory emphasizes managerial 
activity as the key success factor in entrepreneurial 
ventures, it does not provide prescriptive guidance on 
the types of activities that affect the entrepreneurial 
firm success across different contexts. Given the 
relative novelty of the real estate crowdfunding 
phenomenon, the absence of an established dominant 
theory in this domain, and the complexity of the 
context—real estate platforms are two-sided 
markets—we follow recommendations on theory 
building in emergent contexts [16, 17] and we employ 
multiple case study methodology [57] to gain insights 
on the research questions motivating our study. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
We relied on inductive theory development from 
multiple case analysis [16, 17] to identify themes that 
describe entrepreneurial resource orchestration efforts 
in the context of real estate crowdfunding platforms. 
Case studies are acknowledged as a valuable 
methodology for evidence-based theory development 
because case studies can inspire new ideas and new 
constructs [38]. Synthesis of insights across multiple 
cases affords the opportunity to develop a level of 
understanding that transcends individual cases [4, 42]. 
Integration of evidence across cases allows for 
development of more generalizable evidence-based 
theory [9]. 
 
3.1. Research context 
 
Real estate crowdfunding platform operate within 
the larger real estate markets. Real estate is the single 
largest asset class globally. The value of real estate in 
the United States is estimated at $70 trillion. Colliers 
International estimates that $492 billion worth of 
transactions for commercial and residential properties 
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valued over $2.5 million were completed in the United 
States in 2016 [10]. The “fix and flip” residential 
market is estimated to have generated a further $45 
billion in transactions [20].  
Focusing on the typical agents involved in real 
estate transactions, high value real estate asset 
transactions are dominated by institutional investors 
and sponsors, and there are typically multiple 
intermediaries involved in the transactions. For 
example, individual savings in a diversified retirement 
account may include real estate investment trust 
(REIT) holdings as a part of the individual investment 
portfolio. REITs typically raise money from 
investment management companies, perform due 
diligence, invest and operate properties in which they 
invest. 
Prior to the passage of the JOBS Act, public 
solicitation of investments was prohibited in the 
United States. However, real estate sponsors could still 
raise money from institutional and accredited 
investors (individuals with income in excess of 
$200,000 per year for two most recent years or assets 
excluding the primary residence valued over $1 
million) [45].  These, so called, private placements 
could be done under Rule 506(b) of Regulation D (Reg 
D) that provides a safe harbor exemption [45]. 
Solicitation of investment under Rule 506(b) still 
requires the party raising funds to register the offering 
with SEC.  
Regulation A (Reg A), which was available to 
companies prior to the passage of the JOBS Act, 
limited the amount of funding that could be raised 
from non-accredited investors to just $5 million and it 
generally proved to be ineffective because of the low 
cap on the funds that could be raised in relation to the 
associated regulatory filing requirements [39]. The 
JOBS Act contains several provisions which expanded 
the exemptions for public investment solicitations 
[44]. Title IV under the JOBS act afforded fundraising 
of up to $20 million (Tier 1) or $50 million (Tier 2) 
with simplified regulatory filing requirements. These 
exemptions are known as Regulation A+ (Reg A+).  
  
3.2. Case study selection 
 
We sought to obtain the broadest possible sample 
of real estate crowdfunding platforms for our analysis. 
We identified nine real estate crowdfunding platforms 
that were in operation at the beginning of the study in 
August 2017. We solicited participation in the study 
from the founders and executives from all nine 
platforms. We were successful in getting founders 
and/or executives from seven of the nine platforms to 
participate in semi-structured interviews. Table 1 
below provides a summary of the key differences 
among the respective platforms included in our study. 
One of the remaining two platforms that did not 
respond to our invitations to participate in the study 
ceased operations during our interview collection 
period between September and October 2017.  
  
Table 1. Platforms included in the analysis 
Platform / 
Model 
Sources of 
capital 
Sources of 
deal flow 
Regulatory 
compliance 
Platform A 
 
Sponsor led 
platform 
 
$1.4 billion 
in the 
portfolio of 
investments 
 
Started with 
accredited 
investors, 
expanded to 
include non-
accredited. 
Raised own 
investment 
fund. 
Developers Reg A, Reg 
A+, Tier II, 
Tier III 
Platform B 
 
Whole loan 
platform 
 
 
Accredited 
and non-
accredited 
investors 
Fix and flip 
sponsors 
Started with 
Reg A, 
expanded to 
Reg A+, 
Tier II, Tier 
III 
Platform C 
 
Whole loan 
platform 
$489 mil in 
originated 
loans 
 
Institutional 
investors, 
accredited and 
non-accredited 
investors 
Sponsors, 
developers 
Reg A, Reg 
A+ 
Platform D 
 
Sponsor led 
platform 
 
$875 million 
raised 
Wealthy 
foreign 
investors 
The 
company is 
a co-
developer in 
the projects. 
Reg A 
Platform E 
 
Listing 
platform 
 
$3.75 billion 
in funded 
projects 
Wealthy 
individuals 
Sponsors, 
developers 
Not affected 
because 
provides 
services to 
sponsors. 
Platform F 
 
Sponsor-led 
platform 
Broker-
dealer 
Accredited 
investors 
Sponsors, 
developers 
Reg A+, 
Tier II 
Platform G 
 
Listing 
platform 
$700 million 
in 
investments 
Accredited 
and non-
accredited 
investors 
Sponsors, 
developers 
Reg A+, 
Tier II and 
Tier III 
 
We sought to obtain input from multiple 
founders/executives at each company, however we 
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were only successful at obtaining multiple interview 
informants from two of the seven platforms. To 
achieve validation of information across sources, in 
addition to the primary interview data, we collected all 
available information on the respective platform web 
sites and triangulated our analysis across the data 
sources to confirm information consistency. Table 2 
summarizes the data sources underlying our analysis. 
 
Table 2. Data sources 
Platform 
A 
 
Primary data: Co-founder interview: 36 
minutes, co-founder interview, 34 minutes. 
Secondary data: 67 pages of documents 
Platform 
B 
 
Primary: Executive interview, 25 minutes 
Secondary data: 53 pages of documents 
Platform 
C 
 
Primary data: Co-founder interview: 54 
minutes. 
Secondary data: 44 pages of documents 
Platform 
D 
 
Primary data: Executive interview: 23 
minutes. 
Secondary data: 40 pages of documents 
Platform 
E 
 
Primary data: Co-founder interview: 39 
minutes. 
Secondary data: 46 pages of documents 
Platform 
F 
 
Primary data: Co-founder interview: 54 
minutes 
Secondary data: 47 pages of documents 
Platform 
G 
 
Primary data: Co-founder interview: 22 
minutes, Executive interview: 26 minutes 
Secondary data: 33 pages of documents 
 
3.3. Analytical approach 
 
In our analysis, we followed the recommendations 
for grounded theory development [11]. Grounded 
theory development proceeds through iterative data 
coding and inductive theory building steps [11]. In 
coding the events, we focused on resource 
orchestration, the role of technology in platform 
development and the effects of regulatory changes on 
the development of entrepreneurial ventures.  
 
4. Results  
 
4.1. Solving the two-sided market challenge 
 
Focusing on the question of how the real estate 
crowdfunding platforms which are the subject of our 
study solved the two-sided market challenge, we find 
that the companies executed a number of different 
strategies. Platform F founders leveraged their friends 
and family connections to guarantee funding to the 
sponsors who were brought onto the platform first. 
Platform C founders secured a commitment from an 
external investor in the company to guarantee funding 
for the first sponsor who offered an investment 
opportunity on the platform and engaged in active 
promotion prior to the platform launch to attract 
potential investors. Rapid success of the first project 
that was offered to investors on the platform led to a 
flood of investor interest and jumpstarted the 
platform’s growth.  
Platform B, E and G founders leveraged their 
connections within the real estate investor community 
to recruit potential investors onto the respective 
platforms so that the platforms would offer an 
attractive source of financing to the sponsors that 
followed the investors onto the platforms. Platform D 
founders developed the platform to support the 
fundraising for their own real estate projects. Platform 
A founders initially used the deal flow from their own 
real estate ventures to attract investor participation on 
the platform. They subsequently expanded the list of 
available investment opportunities to include 
independently sponsored projects.  
 
4.2. The role of technology in platform 
development 
 
In examining the role of technology as the key 
resource orchestration mechanism across the 
platforms in our study, we find that founders and 
executives nearly uniformly recognize that the 
technology enabling the platforms is the core asset in 
their business. Importantly, the founders and 
executives recognize the need to develop systems that 
uniquely support the coordination functions specific to 
their business. For example, Executive, Platform D 
stated the following:  
We have recently made a huge investment in terms 
of time and resources in technology. We brought along 
an in-house team, people that used to work in open 
innovation at a large bank,  and we propped these 
people to develop internally an investment platform. 
And that doesn't mean simply having a website like any 
other crowdfunding platform. That means actually 
typing the entire process. Meaning from the moment in 
which a new investor comes along and they check the 
investment on the website. They can do every single 
part of the investment online, and we do also 
background checks and all the back of it in 
automatically. And we control that entire process 
which is something that no real estate crowdfunding 
platform is doing so far. 
We find that efforts across platforms have focused 
on developing technology to streamline processes that 
serve the key function of coordinating the interactions 
between the investors and the sponsors as well as the 
reporting functions provided by the platform to each 
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side. Co-founder, Platform A, shared the following 
with us: 
Being able to basically distribute directly over the 
internet to the investor, reach out to the investor and 
transact, that’s a critical one. The ability to essentially 
maintain an extremely large investor base, servicing 
assets, servicing investors and all those, essentially 
require tougher technology. We can’t have tens of 
thousands of investors, individual investors and 
essentially maintain them through manual methods, 
we need software systems that can basically track 
every dollar and every dollar out exactly what 
someone has owed and it would not be possible living 
without technology. 
This is echoed by a co-founder from Platform A: 
We now have over 200,000 users on the site. I think 
we have around 20,000 investors and we only have 
two people now who are answering all of those 
questions. The reason why we've been able to do that 
is because every time someone writes in, we record 
exactly what it is that they're asking about and we 
categorize it basically according to a code and that 
becomes a data point that we're then able to use to 
help drive future iterations of the website, future 
communications, ways that we can improve. 
We also find that the founders and executive in real 
estate crowdfunding platforms focus less on the 
technology itself, but rather on the key benefits of 
leveraging technology as a resource coordination 
mechanism to support innovation. We identified five 
second order themes that were mentioned by the 
participants in our study. Due to the manuscript length 
limitations, we are only able to present the summary 
information about the identified themes here. 
Efficiency: 
 Cost savings through disintermediation – 
platforms are able to offer better financing 
terms to real estate sponsors. 
 Encapsulation of business processes within 
technology – platform investments in 
systems that support the entire business 
process end-to-end. 
 Rapid regulatory reporting – simplification 
of the reporting function. 
 Lowering customer acquisition costs. 
Agility: 
 Fast response to investment opportunities – 
fast underwriting for sponsor-led projects. 
 Rapid response to regulatory changes – 
adoption of Reg A+. 
Scalability: 
 Ability to serve large groups of investors. 
 Replication of expert knowledge in 
customer service management. 
Reach: 
 Move beyond traditional real estate 
investment practices which are typically 
geographically bounded 
 Expose market participants to new 
opportunities 
Personalization: 
 Developing individual investment products 
 Developing individual recommendations 
 
5. Discussion 
 
5.1. The role of technology in resource 
orchestration in entrepreneurial ventures 
 
The key result of our analysis is that entrepreneurs 
and executives in real estate crowdfunding platforms 
are keenly aware of the transformative role of 
technology in digital entrepreneurship. However, they 
do not see technology as a static artifact, but rather 
perceive the technology as a coordinating mechanism 
that unlocks opportunities for innovative business 
practices. Cross-case analysis suggests that the 
coordinating functions of technology can be distilled 
to five distinct themes.  
First, the entrepreneurs leverage technology to 
achieve operating efficiencies in resource 
orchestration. Real estate crowdfunding platforms 
enable more direct interactions between real estate 
sponsors and real estate investors. By the virtue of 
disintermediating many stages in the traditional 
institutional real estate investment process, real estate 
crowdfunding platforms offer more attractive 
financing terms to real estate sponsors and at the same 
time the platforms open access to previously 
inaccessible opportunities for real estate investors.  
Second, because real estate crowdfunding 
platforms encapsulate novel business practices within 
the platforms, they are able to offer faster investment 
decisions to the real estate sponsors and achieve 
extreme efficiencies in acquiring and servicing their 
clientele on both sides of the market. For example, 
Platform A is able to service over 20,000 investors 
with just two representatives because the platform 
efficiently codifies new knowledge. The combination 
of faster decision making and automation contributes 
to the platform’s agility and scalability.  
We also found that Internet-based platforms offer 
benefits of reach and personalization. Real estate 
investments have traditionally been geographically 
limited, with both investors and sponsors having a 
geographic focus. The real estate crowdfunding 
platforms significantly expand the geographical reach 
of investors and sponsors, offering new liquidity in the 
real estate markets. The flexible nature of the platform 
Page 5957
technology enables each investor to enjoy a highly 
personalized experience. Most of the real estate 
crowdfunding platforms afford the investors an 
opportunity to select the projects that they choose to 
participate in, thus creating a highly personalized 
investor experience on the respective platforms. 
Platform A is the exception because it structures all 
investments through a REIT structure, wherein all 
investors effectively hold the same real estate asset 
portfolio. 
 
5.2. Solving the two-sided market challenge 
 
The typical challenges of starting a new venture 
(developing the product/service offering, achieving 
market traction, scaling, etc.) are amplified in two-
sided platforms because the platforms have to 
simultaneously solve the product/market fit for two 
distinct groups of customers [19, 22]. However, we 
observe that the founders of real estate platforms have 
generally succeeded in solving this challenge and they 
developed different solutions to the two-sided 
platform challenge. While some platforms chose to 
internalize the sponsor side of the market, thereby 
simplifying the platform launch challenge to investor 
recruitment, we find that the majority of the platforms 
brought investors onto the platform first, effectively 
guaranteeing funding for the first sponsor offerings. It 
would be of interest to evaluate the generalizability of 
this observation in other contexts. 
 
5.3. Theoretical implications 
 
Our study makes a number of contributions to 
theory. The study is among the first to address the 
recent call for digital entrepreneurship research [33]. 
We focused on the role of technology as a coordinating 
mechanism for resource orchestration in real estate 
crowdfunding platforms. In their essence, real estate 
crowdfunding platforms solve the matching problem 
between financial resources (investors) and real estate 
investment opportunities (sponsors) and therefore, the 
resource coordination task is inherently embedded in 
the platforms. Consistent with the theoretical 
predictions [33], the coordination tasks performed by 
the platforms are dynamic because the resources on 
both sides of the platforms are very fluid. Both 
investors and sponsors have a lot of flexibility in terms 
of their engagement with the individual platforms. In 
this context, platform founders are keenly aware of the 
need to balance both sides of the market to assure that 
both sponsors and investors have a positive experience 
on the platforms. 
Our study also contributes to the growing body of 
research applying resource orchestration theory as a 
helpful theoretical perspective in evidence-based 
entrepreneurship research [2, 5, 8, 46, 49]. Resource 
orchestration theory emphasizes that understanding 
how businesses acquire, recombine and leverage 
resources is central to understanding business success 
[8, 46]. While our initial focus on the technology-
empowered activities uncovered a diverse set of 
entrepreneurial activities involved in building two-
sided platforms, inductive analysis of the emergent 
higher-order themes across the activities suggests that 
there are higher-order goals focused on achieving 
efficiency, agility, scalability, reach and 
personalization that are being pursued by the 
platforms. These themes provide the foundation for 
future research that can evaluate the generalizability of 
these higher-order themes in resource orchestration in 
technology-enabled platforms in other contexts. 
We also make a contribution to the broader 
crowdfunding literature. While real estate 
crowdfunding has gained momentum in practice [28], 
there has been relatively little research in this domain 
[50]. Our study offers the foundation for further 
research, by defining the key agents in this area of 
practice (investors, sponsors and platforms), 
documenting the diversity of real estate crowdfunding 
platform types and outlining different governance 
structures that emerge (direct investments, REITs and 
listing platforms). The seven platforms in our study 
target different sets of investors (unaccredited, 
accredited and institutional) and work with different 
types of individual and institutional sponsors using 
different regulatory structures (Reg D, Reg A, Reg 
A+). The platforms engage in different degrees of 
investment opportunity vetting, ranging from 
solicitation of investments in own property 
development projects, to performing due diligence on 
investment opportunities listed on the platform, to 
simply listing the opportunities as a marketing service 
to sponsors. These observations are consistent with 
prior theoretical arguments that demand heterogeneity 
may affect the diversity of the business forms [37]. 
The explication of the emergent platform 
configurations affords an opportunity to examine how 
the configuration choices will affect the development 
of the respective platforms as the real estate 
crowdfunding market matures. One of the apparent 
trends is that lowering the barriers to listing sponsor-
led projects on the platform is associated with 
significant growth in the volume of transactions. 
Platform E in our study offers only listing services and 
it reports having brokered over $3.75 billion in 
transactions, far more than any of the other platforms. 
Our work also has important implications for the 
research on multi-sided platforms. Multi-sided 
platforms are a notoriously challenging type of 
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entrepreneurial ventures [19, 22]. We find that at least 
seven entrepreneurial teams have successfully solved 
the two-sided platform launch challenge in real estate 
crowdfunding. Notably, the platforms in our study 
have pursued different strategies in solving the 
challenge. Two platforms have effectively internalized 
the demand side of the market to reduce the challenge 
to just attracting the investors, while four of the 
remaining five brought the investors onto the 
platforms first to attract sponsors onto the platforms 
and one launched the platform with a sponsor as the 
first entry. These observations suggest that there may 
not be a single dominant strategy for two-sided 
platform launch. This is in contrast with prior 
theoretical research focused on the identification of the 
optimal platform seeding strategies [14, 34]. 
Finally, our study also contributes to research on 
the role of regulation in entrepreneurial entry.  We  
find that four of the seven platforms in our study 
predate the JOBS Act, which is commonly perceived 
as the key facilitating event for the emergence of debt 
and equity based crowdfunding platforms [47]. These 
findings suggest that in order to understand the 
potential impact of new regulation on entrepreneurial 
venture creation, it is important to examine existing 
business ecosystem to understand how existing 
businesses may be impacted by the new deregulation 
efforts and whether the existing firms may be the de 
facto beneficiaries of deregulation, whereas the 
intended effect may have been primarily focused on 
the creation of new ventures. 
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